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MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
TIMING OF JUDICIAL REDRESS FROM ERRONEOUS
ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION'
By E. BLYTHE STASON*O NE OF THE less spectacular but thoroughly troublesome prob-
lems of administrative procedure is the problem of proper
timing of measures to be taken to secure judicial redress from
erroneous administrative action. The determination of the stage
in the progress of a controversy in administrative law at which
judicial redress may be effectively requested by an aggrieved
party is the subject of this paper.
The courts are groping with greater or less success for formulae
to fit the wide variety of situations encountered. They are seeking
orderly rules of procedure which will permit proper freedom of
action for administrative agencies engaged in enforcing their
respective statutes, and which, at the same time, will provide ade-
quate protection from administrative errors.2  The rules that are
being evolved are practical rather than profound, although they
are not free from subtleties, and, as is so often true in complex
situations, there is a good deal of fumbling for the right answers.
When we examine the specific cases and decisions dealing with
the question of the timing of judicial redress from erroneous ad-
*Dean and Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School.
'Address delivered as Part II (b) of the Program of the Institute on
Administrative Law and Procedure, held at the Annual Meeting of the
American Bar Association, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, September 12 and
13, 1940.
2As Mr. Justice Stone said, speaking on the very point in one of the
famous Morgan opinions (United States v. Morgan, (1939) 307 U. S. 183,
59 Sup. Ct. 795, 83 L. Ed. 1211), there is a certain "cardinal principle"
which guides us in formulating our procedural rules for judicial review of
administrative action. "In construing a statute setting up an administrative
agency, and providing for judicial review of its action, court and agency are
not to be regarded as wholly independent and unrelated instrumentalities of
justice, the one acting in the performance of its prescribed statutory duty
without regard to the appropriate function of the other in securing the
plainly indicated objects of the statute. Court and agency are the means
adopted to attain the prescribed end, and so far as their duties are defined
by the words of the statute, those words should be construed so as to attain
that end through co-ordinated action. Neither body should repeat in this day
the mistake made by the courts of law when equity was struggling for recog-
nition as an ameliorating system of justice; neither can rightly be regarded
by the other as an alien intruder, to be tolerated, if must be, but never to
be encouraged or aided by the other in the attainment of the common aim."
In other words, the courts must seek orderly rules of procedure to accom-
plish as well as possible the reconciliation of the ends of governmental
administration with the private rights affected thereby.
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ministrative action, we discover that most of them cluster around
five principal propositions, as follows:
First, the necessity of resort to the administrative tribunal prior
to going to the courts for relief, in the event of controversies fall-
ing within the general area of the tribunal's statutory power. This
may be called the "doctrine of exclusive administrative jurisdic-
tion" or, as it is sometimes called, the "doctrine of prior resort."
Second, the necessity of exhausting all of the available ad-
ministrative remedies before turning to the courts for relief. This
may be called "the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies."
Third, the rule, of somewhat limited application, to the effect
that a party to a controversy who fails to exhaust his administra-
tive remedies and who loses the right to exercise them because of
lapse of time, may not thereafter seek relief in the courts, even
though the administrative action contains invalidating error suffi-
cient to render the action void. This may be called "the doctrine
of estoppel for failure to pursue administrative remedies."
Fourth, the necessity of exhausting all state processes, including
both administrative and court processes, before turning to the
federal courts for relief. This is the so-called rule of the Prentis
Case,3 and also involves the provisions of the Johnson Act.4
Fifth, the proper procedural pathway in the federal courts after
all state administrative and court processes have been duly ex-
hausted.
It is apparent that each of these propositions deals with the
timing of judicial redress rather than the scope thereof or the
extent to which the courts will delve into the administrative
record. The latter phase of the subject of judicial review is an
exceedingly interesting one. It involves nice questions of a phil-
osophical character-questions of the proper balance of power
between the courts and administration, of ways and means of
checking abuse of administrative power. These questions will be
explored later in the Institute program. First, however, I shall
develop the question of timing of judicial redress, a much more
prosaic and less intriguing field of inquiry. Like so many of the
adjective phases of our law, it is full of fine distinctions and dull
pragmatism, with no crowning glory of political, economic, or
3Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line, (1908) 211 U. S. 210, 29 Sup. Ct. 67,
53 L. Ed. 150.
448 Stat. at L. 775, 28 U. S. C. A. sec. 41, 28 F. C. A. sec. 41.
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social policy to relieve its drab detail. Let us examine each of the
five foregoing propositions seriatim.
I. THE: DOCTRINE OF ExCLUSIVE JURISDICTION OR
PIOR REsoRT
First, then, we shall consider the necessity of resort to the ad-
ministrative tribunal prior to going to the courts for relief, when
a controversy arises within the general area of the tribunal's
statutory power-the so-called doctrine of exclusive jurisdiction.
This doctrine has been termed the "keystone of the arch of ad-
ministrative regulation."5  It stems from the leading Interstate
Commerce Commission case, Tezas & Pacific Ry. v. Abilene Cot-
ton Oil Co.6 In that case a suit was brought in the Texas state
courts for reparations for allegedly unreasonable railroad rates
charged by the railroad company. No prior application for relief
had been made by the shipper to the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission, and consequently that agency had not been given an
opportunity to bring its expert attention to bear upon the question
at issue. The defense by the railroad was based upon the asser-
tion that the Interstate Commerce Act by implication barred a
remedy in the courts until the commission had first been permitted
to pass upon the case. It was true that sec. 22 of the act expressly
provided that "nothing in this Act contained shall in any way
abridge or alter remedies now existing at common law or by
statute, but the provisions of this Act are in addition to such
remedies." In spite of this provision, however, the United States
Supreme Court held that the defense was sound, that the need
of uniformity in the fixing of railroad rates was paramount, and
that this need warranted the Court in construing the Interstate
Commerce Act to require by implication that all questions con-
cerning the reasonableness of rates must be submitted to and
decided in the first instance by the commission. This is the doc-
trine of prior resort or exclusive jurisdiction. In the face of the
express provisions of sec. 22, the construction may seem a little
strained, but the result is not devoid of common sense. In any
event, it was the beginning of a long line of decisions of like
purport, reaching into many branches of administrative law.
Probably the most satisfactory statement of the theory under-
lying the doctrine of exclusive jurisdiction is found in a 1932
5See Primary Jurisdiction-Effect of Administrative Remedies on the
Jurisdiction of Courts, (1938) 51 Harv. L. Rev. 1251.6(1927) 204 U. S. 426, 27 Sup. Ct. 350, 51 L. Ed. 553.
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decision of the United States Supreme Court, United States Navi-
gation Co. v. Cizard Steamship Co.7 The United States Naviga-
tion Company was a corporation operating ships in foreign com-
merce. It brought suit in the federal district court to enjoin the
Cunard Steamship Company from carrying on an alleged con-
spiracy and combination in violation of the Sherman and Clayton
Acts. Specifically, it was charged that the defendant made a
practice of illegal discrimination in favor of such shippers as
would agree to confine their shipment to the lines of the defendant
company. The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint
on the ground that the court had no jurisdiction, since the matters
of which complaint was made lay within the exclusive jurisdiction
of the United States Shipping Board under the Shipping Act of
1916. It was said in effect that the plaintiff should first have
applied to the Shipping Board for relief before seeking judicial
redress. The court agreed with the position taken by the de-
fendant. In its opinion the court compared the Shipping Act
with the Interstate Commerce Act and referred to the Abilene
Cotton Oil Company decision as binding authority. The court
also referred to certain other pertinent cases, namely, Great North-
ern Ry. Co. v. Merchants Elevator Company8 and Board v. Great
Northern Ry. Co." A brief quotation from the Cunard Steamship
Case brings out the theory upon which the doctrine of exclusive
jurisdiction is based, outlines some of the situations in which
it is applied, and describes the limit of its application. The court
said:
"... In Great No. Ry. v. Merchants Elev. Co.,10 ... the general
rule and an exception to it are considered. The immediate ques-
tion there at issue concerned merely the legal construction of an
interstate tariff, no question of fact, either as an aid to construc-
tion, or in any other respect, and no other question of administra-
tion, being involved. It was held that the issue was within the
jurisdiction of the courts without preliminary resort to the com-
mission. But the distinction between that case and one where
preliminary resort to the commission is necessary was definitely
stated. Such resort, it was said, must be had where a rate, rule,
or practice is attacked as unreasonable or unjustly discriminatory,
and also where it is necessary in the construction of a tariff, to
determine upon evidence the peculiar meaning of words or the
existence of incidents alleged to be attached by usage to the trans-
7(1932) 284 U. S. 474, 52 Sup. Ct. 247, 76 L. Ed. 408.
8(1922) 259 U. S. 285, 42 Sup. Ct. 477, 66 L. Ed. 943.
0(1930) 281 U. S. 412, 50 Sup. Ct. 391, 74 L. Ed. 936.
10(1922) 259 U. S. 285, 291, 42 Sup. Ct. 477, 66 L. Ed. 943.
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action.... But what construction shall be given to a railroad tariff
presents ordinarily a question of law which does not differ in
character from those presented when the construction of any
other document is in dispute.
"In Board v. Great Northern Ry.,"1 . . . an interlocutory in-
junction had been granted by a federal district court of three
judges in a suit assailing intrastate railroad rates as working undue
and unreasonable discrimination against interstate commerce. The
order granting the injunction was reversed on the ground that the
district court was without power to entertain the suit in advance
of a determination of the question by the Interstate Commerce
Commission.
"'The inquiry' we said (pp. 421-422), 'would necessarily relate
to technical and intricate matters of fact, and the solution of the
question would demand the exercise of sound administrative dis-
cretion. The accomplishment of the purpose of Congress could
not be had without the comprehensive study of an expert body con-
tinuously employed in administrative supervision. Only through
the action of such a body could there be secured the uniformity
of ruling upon which appropriate protection from unreasonable
exactions and unjust discriminations must depend.'
"So the rule has been applied where recovery was sought by a
shipper for unreasonable and excessive freight rates not found
to be unreasonable by the commission, Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Abilene
Cotton Oil Co., 2 ... ; where the question was as to the reasonable-
ness of the carrier's practice in distributing cars, M11idland Valley
R. R. v. Barkley," . .. ; where the reasonableness of a particular
practice of routing was involved, Northern Pac. Ry. v. Solutm, 4
* . . ; where the continuance of service on an industrial track was
assailed as unduly discriminatory, Western & A. R. Co. v. Georgia
Pub. Serv. Comm.," 5 ... ; and where an action was brought under
section 7 of the Anti-trust Act, based upon an alleged conspiracy
among carriers to fix rates, Keogh v. C. & N. W. Ry. Co.1' ...
In the last case cited it was pointed out (p. 163) that to permit a
shipper to recover under the Anti-trust Act, the amount recovered
might, like a rebate, operate to give him a preference over his
trade competitors. 'Uniform treatment would not result, even if
all sued, unless the highly improbable happened, and the several
juries and courts gave to each the same measure of relief. . ... '
And so in the Cunard Steamship Case the charge of illegal
discrimination was held to lie within the exclusive primary juris-
diction of the Shipping Board. The result was achieved by inter-
11(1930) 281 U. S. 412, 50 Sup. Ct. 391, 74 L. Ed. 936.32(1927) 204 U. S. 426, 27 Sup. Ct. 350, 51 L. Ed. 553.
28(1928) 276 U. S. 482, 48 Sup. Ct. 342, 72 L. Ed. 664.
14(1918) 247 U. S. 477, 483, 38 Sup. Ct. 550, 62 L. Ed. 1221.
15(1925) 267 U. S. 493, 497, 45 Sup. Ct. 409, 69 L. Ed. 753.
10(1922) 260 U. S. 156, 43 Sup. Ct. 47, 67 L. Ed. 183.
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pretation of the statute. The court said that "the scope and
evident purpose of the Shipping Act as in the case of the Interstate
Commerce Act, are demonstrative of the conclusion."
The doctrine thus conceived in the railroad and shipping
board cases has expanded into many other areas of administrative
law. It has moved into state public utility regulation, into tax
proceedings, and more recently into the extremely active fields of
labor and industrial regulation. In each of these fields it consti-
tutes a response to the presumption of expertness in administrative
action and the desire to give that expertness a reasonable opportu-
nity to come to grips with the technical problems within adminis-
trative jurisdiction. Furthermore, it is thought that by requiring
initial resort to the administrative agency, uniformity of application
of the regulatory laws can best be attained. These are the two
reasons commonly asserted on behalf of the doctrine, which, as
has already been said, is derived by judicial interpretation of the
enabling acts. In passing, we should note one very important and
perhaps essential result flowing from the application of the doc-
trine. It is this: If the statutes make the decision of an admin-
istrative tribunal conclusive on fact questions, as so many of
them do nowadays, the doctrine of exclusive jurisdiction com-
petently guards this provision from nullification by preventing
litigants from side-stepping the tribunal by going directly into
the courts and thus securing judicial decision of the facts at issue.
Does the doctrine of exclusive jurisdiction apply to all issues
cognizable by administrative tribunals? In the early Supreme
Court decisions it was dearly limited to questions of fact having
a technical content, with respect to which the tribunals, being
informed by experience, could be presumed to have special techni-
cal competence. Questions of reasonableness of rates, discrimina-
tion, unfair practices, and similar fact questions are obviously of
the variety that should be first referred to the technically trained
tribunal created by law to deal with them. In later decisions, how-
ever, the doctrine has been extended to include certain questions of
law, particularly those the answers to which are aided by or
depend in large degree upon technical knowledge. For example,
if the interpretation of a railway tariff depends upon the peculiar
technical meaning of a word or phrase as distinguished from its
ordinary meaning, the administrative tribunal will under more
recent cases be afforded exclusive jurisdiction to make the initial
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determination of its meaning." The doctrine of exclusive jurisdic-
tion has also been extended beyond the range of quasi-judicial
matters and into the area of sub-legislative or rule-making func-
tions, where, of course, the element of administrative discretion
looms large, and where it seems especially appropriate to afford
that discretion an opportunity to justify itself. For example, the
United States Supreme Court has recently held that the secretary
of agriculture of the state of Nebraska could not be enjoined from
enforcing an allegedly invalid administrative regulation without
application first being made to the secretary for modification of the
objectionable rule.18
But clearly a limit of applicability of the doctrine has been
established by the decided cases. The courts have held that purely
legal questions, even though within the cognizance of the admin-
istrative tribunal, are not subject to the rule of exclusive jurisdic-
tion. They may be submitted directly to the courts, without first
going to the tribunal. Hence, it has been held that a non-technical
dispute as to the legal interpretation to be placed on a railroad
tariff need not first be taken to the commission. 9 Furthermore, it
has been held in several cases that it is not necessary to resort first
to the administrative agency in attacking the legality of the agency
or of the statute under which it was credited.2 0 The dividing line
between applicability and non-applicability of the doctrine is not
fixed by a purely conceptual difference between questions of law
and questions of fact, a line of cleavage which is difficult to draw,
to say the least. On the contrary, as Mr. Justice Brandeis said in
the Great Northern Railway Case, it depends upon "the character
of the controverted question and the nature of the inquiry necessary
f or its solution." The doctrine will be applied if the courts, having in
mind considerations of technical competence and the need of uni-
formity, will assume that the legislature intended the issues to be
left to the administrative agency for initial determination.
One of the most recent United States Supreme Court cases
dealing with the subject is a Labor Board case, Meyers v. Bethle-
hem Shipbuilding Corporation.21 The plaintiff corporation sought
"7Texas & Pacific Ry. Co. v. American Tie & Timber Co., (1914) 234
U. S. 138, 34 Sup. Ct. 885, 58 L. Ed. 1255.
'sPeterson Baking Co. v. Bryan, (1934) 290 U. S. 570, 54 Sup. Ct. 277,
78 L. Ed. 505.
'
9 Great Northern Ry. v. Merchants Elevator Co., (1922) 259 U. S. 285,
42 Sup. Ct. 477, 66 L. Ed. 943.
20oSee discussion and cases cited in Administrative Action as a Pre-
requisite of Judicial Relief, (1935) 35 Col. L. Rev. 230, 234.
21(1938) 303 U5. S. 41, 58 Sup. Ct. 459, 82 L. Ed. 638.
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to enjoin the National Labor Relations Board from conducting
hearings on charges of unfair labor practices, alleging that the cor-
poration's business was purely intrastate, that its relations with its
employees could not hinder or interfere with interstate commerce,
and hence that the Board had no jurisdiction. Section 10 (a) of
the Labor Relations Act provides that
"The Board is empowered .. . to prevent any person from
engaging in any unfair labor practice affecting (interstate) com-
merce. This power shall be exclusive and shall not be affected by
any other means of adjustment or prevention that has been or
may be established by agreement, code, law, or otherwise."
A preliminary injunction was granted by the federal district court
on the ground that the controversy lay beyond the jurisdictional
limits of the Board. This was affirmed by the circuit court of
appeals. On certiorari, however, the United States Supreme
Court held that the district court had no power to enjoin the
Labor Board from conducting the hearing under such circum-
stances. The court quoted the above language from sec. 10, and
held that Congress had intended exclusive jurisdiction to lie in the
board, even as to the constitutional jurisdictional fact involved.
It was true, said the court, that the board had jurisdiction under
the statute only if the complaint concerned interstate or foreign
commerce, but the Congress has power to vest exclusive jurisdic-
tion to determine the jurisdictional question in the first instance
in the board, and it has done so by the National Labor Relations
Act. To hold otherwise, so the court said,
"In effect would substitute the district court for the board as
the tribunal to hear and determine what Congress declared the
board exclusively should hear and determine in the first instance."
The conclusion of the court was based in part upon the expres's
language of the statute and in part upon "the long settled rule of
judicial administration that no one is entitled to judicial relief for
a supposed or threatened injury until the prescribed administrative
remedy has been exhausted."22
This case, then, may be taken to extend the doctrine of exclu-
2 Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., (1938) 303 U. S. 41, 58 Sup.
Ct. 459, 463, 82 L. Ed. 638. In support of its statement, the court cited many
cases, including Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line, (1908) 211 U. S. 210, 29
Sup. Ct. 67, 53 L. Ed. I50; Gorham Mfg. Co. v. State Tax Commission,
(1924) 266 U. S. 265, 45 Sup. Ct. 80, 69 L. Ed. 279; Porter v. Investors
Syndicate, (1932) 286 U. S. 461, 52 Sup. Ct. 617, 76 L. Ed. 1226; White v.
Johnson, (1931) 282 U. S. 367, 51 Sup. Ct. 115, 75 L. Ed. 388; Peterson
Baking Co. v. Bryan, (1934) 290 U. S. 570, 54 Sup. Ct. 277, 78 L. Ed. 519;
Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Seattle, (1934) 291 U. S. 300, 54 Sup. Ct. 383,
78 L. Ed. 810; and St. Louis & San Francisco Railway Co. v. Alabama Pub.
Serv. Comm., (1929) 279 U. S. 560, 49 Sup. Ct. 383, 73 L. Ed. 893.
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sive jurisdiction to include the constitutional and jurisdictional
facts which determine the boundary lines of the tribunal's power.
Instead of the tribunal having a strict doctrine of ultra vires hang-
ing over it, it is given more the character of a court of general
jurisdiction. In view of the conclusiveness accorded the fact
determinations of so many administrative tribunals, the Meyers
decision holds particular significance. It is inconsistent with the
United States Supreme Court decision of Crowell v. Benson,
23
holding constitutional jurisdictional facts to be subject to full
judicial review in de novo proceedings. Possibly the latter doc-
trine is destined for discard, and, indeed, it is probably not unduly
precipitate to anticipate even further extension of the doctrine of
exclusive jurisdiction. Perhaps those "purely legal questions"
with respect to which the doctrine has been hitherto held to be
inapplicable will be swept into the fold.
As to state court rulings on the doctrine of exclusive jurisdic-
tion, most state courts seem to follow the federal rules, although
several have adopted variations of it. Judicial decisions in Cali-
fornia, Texas, and Oklahoma illustrate such variations, and an
important recent decision in Rhode Island seems completely to
repudiate the doctrine so far as that state is concerned.2'
So much for the first of the five propositions relative to timing
judicial redress-the doctrine of exclusive jurisdiction-the "key-
stone in the arch of regulation."
II. THE DOCTRINE OF EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE
REMEDIES
The second specific proposition to be examined is the necessity
of exhausting all available administrative remedies before turning
to the courts for relief-the doctrine of exhaustion of administra-
tive remedies. In one sense this doctrine may be deemed to be
a first-cousin of the doctrine of exclusive jurisdiction, translated
to a later stage of the administrative proceedings. But it has
evolved separately.
The doctrine of exclusive jurisdiction which we have just ex-
amined is a rule of interpretation of statutory language and deter-
mination of legislative intent as to this phase of judicial administra-
tion. The doctrine of exhaustion, on the other hand, has been
evolved as a rule of self limitation which the courts have invoked
23(1932) 285 U. S. 22, 52 Sup. Ct. 285, 76 L. Ed. 598.
24Maine Realty Co. v. Blackstone Valley Gas & Electric Co., (1937)
59 R. I. 29, 193 AtI. 879.
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in the process of developing the boundary line between the powers
of administrative tribunals and those of the courts. The reasons
given for the rule are various. Some courts have based it upon
the presumed correctness of official acts. Others have based it on
the general equity doctrine of the adequacy of the remedy at law.
Still others have referred to interdepartmental comity as the
motivating influence. In the leading case on the subject, Prentis
V. Atlantiv Coast Line Co.,25 the United States Supreme Court
very clearly took the position that comity between different depart-
ments of government demanded that the federal equity court
should stay its hand until the state administrative processes were
completed.
This doctrine of exhaustion rears its head with great frequency
throughout the entire range of administrative law. It is an im-
portant doctrine, too often ignored, misunderstood, or overlooked
by members of the bar, and, hence, it is frequently the cause of
distress to clients. Unfortunately, the details of and the limits
upon the applicability of the doctrine are far from dear. In fact,
they are full of doubt and uncertainty. One of the sources of con-
fusion is the uncertainty as to whether the doctrine is a definite,
universally applicable rule of equity jurisdiction or is simply a
principle of comity lying within the discretion of the court, to be
applied or not as circumstances warrant. When adequacy of the
legal remedy has been relied upon as the reason for the rule, the
courts have usually treated it as a limitation upon jurisdiction;
when comity has been the base, the courts have been inclined to
leave the doctrine in a discretionary form. When the same court
applies both theories, interesting confusion follows. For example,
in the 1937 term of the United States Supreme Court, we find two
opinions of the highest court in the land pointing in opposite direc-
tions on this very phase of the matter. In Natural Gas Pipeline
Co. v. Slattery," the court stated by way of dictim that the issuance
-'(1908) 211 U. S. 210, 29 Sup. Ct. 67, 53 L. Ed. 150. The case involved
a bill in the federal district court to enjoin an order of the Virginia Cor-
poration Commission fixing railroad rates. Said Mr. Justice Holmes, giving
his reason for the rule:
"The state of Virginia has endeavored to impose the highest safeguards
upon the exercise of the great power given to the State Corporation Com-
mission, not only by the character of the members of that commission, but
by making its decisions dependent upon the assent of the same historic body
that is intrusted with the preservation of the most valued constitutional rights,
if the railroads see fit to appeal. It seems to us only a just recognition of the
solicitude with which their rights have been guarded that they should make
sure that the state, in its final legislative action, would not respect what they
think their rights to be, before resorting to the courts of the United States."
26(1937) 302 U. S. 300. 311 ; 58 Sup. Ct. 199, 204, 82 L. Ed. 276.
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of an injunction in the presence of available administrative reme-
dies lies within the discretion of the trial court, whereas Mr.
Justice Brandeis, at the same term of court in Meyers v. Bethlehem
Shipbuilding Corporation,27 declared that the exhaustion doctrine
is not merely a principle governing the exercise of judicial dis-
cretion, but is a definite rule of judicial administration. This is
confusing, to say the least.
In order to become as concrete as possible, let us survey very
briefly the more important situations in which the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies has been applied. At least
seven different types of cases may be identified. They are as
follows:
(a) Necessity of exhaustion of administrative remedies when
successive administrative appeals are provided by statute. In the
event that a statute setting up an administrative tribunal also
creates one or more appellate administrative tribunals, it is almost
invariably held that a party who is aggrieved by action of the
initial agency must first seek relief by recourse to the appellate
agency or agencies. 28 The most common example is found in state
tax administration. Property is assessed for taxation by local
assessing officers, assessments are reviewed by local boards of
review, and provision is usually made for ultimate review by a
state tax commission or a state board of equalization, or both.
Many judicial decisions bear out the conclusion that all of these
steps must be pursued by an aggrieved taxpayer, at least in cer-
tain types of cases, before he may seek judicial relief.29 Nor is
there lack of merit to the application of the rule of exhaustion of
administrative remedies in such cases. If the state has conscien-
tiously provided administrative means of correcting the errors
of its administrative agencies, orderly procedure and common
sense bespeak the utilization of the means. Incidentally, a burden
is lifted from the courts to the extent that the administrative
appeals are successful in removing causes of grievance.
(b) Necessity of submitting motions for rehearing before the
administrative tribunal which issues the order of which com-
plaint is made. Frequently statutes setting up administrative
27(1938) 303 U. S. 41, 51; 58 Sup. Ct. 459, 464, (footnote) 82 L. Ed.
638.
28United States v. Sing Tuck, (1903) 194 U. S. 161, 24 Sup. Ct. 621,
48 L. Ed. 917 (immigration); First National Bank v. Weld County (1924)
264 U. S. 450, 44 Sup. Ct. 385, 68 L. Ed. 784 (property tax assessment);
Leone v. Brewer, (1932) 259 N. Y. 57, 182 N. E. 57 (zoning).29First National Bank v. Weld County, (1924) 264 U. S. 450, 44 Sup.
Ct. 385, 68 L. Ed. 784.
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tribunals provide for the filing of motions for rehearings on final
orders. The question then arises as to whether or not a request
for rehearing is a necessary step to be taken in the administrative
process before the aggrieved party may seek judicial redress. If
the motion for rehearing is definitely required by statute as a
condition precedent to a statutory appeal, courts uniformly hold
such motion to be an essential part of the administrative process,
and the motion must be made before judicial relief is sought. On
the other hand, if the motion for rehearing is merely permissive
under the provisions of the statute, doubt arises as to the neces-
sity of filing and pursuing it. Doubt is engendered by conflicting
opinions in our federal courts. In a 1923 decision, Prendergast
v. New York Telephone Co.,30 the United States Supreme Court
held that application for rehearing was not a necessary condition
precedent to judicial relief when the pertinent statute merely con-
ferred the privilege of such a motion, but did not make it man-
datory. A number of subsequent decisions, both state and federal,
have followed this holding. However, in a very recent decision
by the court of appeals of the District of Columbia, Red River
Broadcasting Co. v. Federal Communications Commission,3' the
court held, under the circumstances of that case, that a motion for
rehearing was a necessary step in the exhaustion of the administra-
tive remedy, and that the plaintiff should have made such a
motion even though the statute made the motion permissive only
and not a condition precedent to the statutory appeal, and even
though the right to the rehearing was subject to the discretionary
control of the commission to which the motion was addressed.
The circumstances of the case were somewhat unusual, for the
reason that the complainant in the case had not been a party to the
proceeding before the commission, although he claimed to have
been adversely affected by the order which granted a broadcasting
license to a competitor. The decision may not mean that a party
to the proceedings who has already presented his case to the
tribunal must file a motion for rehearing under the permissive
type of statute. Indeed, to impose such a requirement would seem
to carry the exhaustion doctrine too far. To require a motion
for rehearing in such cases, with its consequent delays, when the
legislature creating the commission has not seen fit to make the
motion mandatory as a condition precedent to the appeal, seems
unnecessary to orderly procedure. The motion is almost sure to
30(1923) 262 U. S. 43, 43 Sup. Ct. 466. 67 L. Ed. 853.
31(1938) 69 App. D. C. 1, 98 F. (2d) 282.
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be overruled and thus prove quite futile. In this respect it dif-
fers from the appeal to a higher administrative agency, where
futility is not to be anticipated, but, on the other hand, correc-
tion of error may be expected.
(c) Necessity for exhaustion of the administrative process
when the administrative tribunal has already informally indicated
that an adverse decision will be rendered. It occasionally hap-
pens that the administrative agency will express in advance its
opinion concerning the action which it will take in a particular
controversy. If the advance opinion is adverse, the question
arises as to whether or not it is necessary to submit the contro-
versy to the formal, final decision of the administrative agency
which has already announced itself. Does the futility of further
pursuing the administrative process serve to excuse the litigant,
from following it? Gilchrist v. Interborough Rapid Transit Co.?2
is a case in point. There the United States Supreme Court in-
sisted that the company exhaust its administrative remedies be-
fore the commission even though the commission had clearly and
publicly expressed the view that it lacked the power to give the
relief sought.
More recently, however, in the case of City Bank Farmers'
Trust Co. v. Schnader,33 the Supreme Court seemingly adopted a
different view. The case involved the imposition of the Pennsyl-
vania inheritance tax upon an estate, part of which lay within and
part without the state. In a suit to enjoin the levy of the tax, the
plaintiff alleged that the state tax officials had appraised certain
property of the estate and were about to impose a tax upon it as
property subject to taxation in Pennsylvania, although it had, in
fact, no taxable situs within that state. The question of taxability
had been referred to and was supposed to be determined by the
state department of justice. It was alleged that the attorney
general had stated orally that the claim of non-taxability would be
denied, but no final ruling had been made. The state contended
that the plaintiff's bill was prematurely filed. The court, speak-
ing through Mr. Justice Roberts, held that the bill was not pre-
mature, and that the plaintiff had sufficiently exhausted his ad-
ministrative remedies to be entitled to judicial redress. He said
in part:
"_ - In view of what has been said, the appellant's cause of
action in equity will not, strictly speaking, arise until an appraise-
32(1929) 279 U. S. 159, 49 Sup. Ct. 282, 73 L. Ed. 652.
3s (1934) 291 U. S. 24, 54 Sup. Ct. 259, 78 L. Ed. 628.
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ment is made and certified to the department of revenue and notice
of the fact is given appellant. However, in view of the allega-
tions of the bill, -we are not inclined to hold the suit premature.
The bill charges that the secretary of revenue has refused to issue
a waiver of tax, and that the attorney general has notified the
appellant and the state's appraiser the property is subject to the
tax, and the appellant's claim for exemption will be denied. The
commonwealth's law officers plainly intend to perform what they
consider their duty, and will, unless restrained, cause the assess-
ment and imposition of the tax. The action the legality of which
is challenged thus appears sufficiently imminent and certain to
justify the intervention of a court of equity."
In short, the plaintiff need not await a final order, since the officer
had already indicated his plain intent.
So we find judicial decisions pointing either way on the ques-
tion as to whether or not an informal interlocutory expression
of adverse opinion by the administrative agency will excuse the
aggrieved party from further pursuing his administrative reme-
dies.34 The future will have to provide us with the definite
answer to the question. The law should not require futile action,
but at the same time there is always the likelihood of the ad-
ministrative officer changing his mind after he has been fully
advised. There are arguments each way, but it is probably fair
to conclude that unless there is a clear showing that the final
decision has been reached, so that nothing remains but the prepara-
tion and entry of the final order, the parties should be expected to
pursue the administrative process to the end.
(d) Necessity of exhaustion of administrative remedies in
case of unreasonable delay by the administrative authorities.
Occasionally, either because of pressure of other duties or for
more invidious reasons, administrative agencies are guilty of un-
conscionable delay in affording the relief sought from them.
The question then arises as to whether or not the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies must give way in the face
of such delay. Several such cases have arisen, the outstanding
one being Smith v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co.3 5  The company had
applied for an increase in rates. The commission delayed uncon-
scionably in reaching its final decision. In fact, about two years
had elapsed without any material indication of forward motion in
the case. Finally the company brought a bill to enjoin the com-
34For further development of the subject citing cases each way, see
Administrative Action as a Prerequisite of Judicial Relief, (1935) 35 Col.
L. Rev. 230, 236.
35(1926) 270 U. S. 587, 46 Sup. Ct. 408, 70 L. Ed. 747.
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mission from preventing the increased rate schedule being given
immediate effect. The commission contended that the company
should have exhausted its administrative remedies. The United
States Supreme Court found that the delay was unreasonable,
and that the tribunal by its conduct
"evinced an entire lack of that acute appreciation of justice
which should characterize a tribunal charged with the delicate
and important duty of regulating the rates of a public utility
with fairness to its patrons and with a quick hand to preserve it
from confiscation."
The court concluded that the parties wvere not obliged under such
circumstances to exhaust their administrative remedies which
had proved and seemed likely to continue to prove quite futile.
The result is obviously sound, and presumably it is the law
generally.
(e) Necessity of exhaustion of administrative remedies in
case of claim of lack of jurisdiction of the tribunal. Does the
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies apply when the
contention is being made by the aggrieved party that the tribunal
has, in fact, no jurisdiction over the controversy? In other words,
must the tribunal be given the privilege of passing on the ques-
tion of its own jurisdiction to the extent that the party must pur-
sue all available steps in the administrative process? In connec-
tion with the doctrine of exclusive jurisdiction, hitherto discussed,
reference was made to the case of Meyers v. Bethlehem Ship-
building Corporation."8 In that case it was held that even juris-
dictional questions of a constitutional content (interstate com-
merce) are subject to the doctrine of exclusive jurisdiction, at
least when the questions involve fact considerations within the
technical competence of the tribunal. The same reasoning which
justifies the conclusion in the Meyers Case would lead us to the
conclusion that the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative reme-
dies should apply in similar cases, and there are a few judicial
decisions in accord.37 In other words, whenever the jurisdictional
question has a factual or technical content, one must pursue his
administrative remedies to the end, even though he is contending
that the tribunal lacks jurisdiction to hear the case. If the juris-
dictional question involves purely a question of law, perhaps the re-
sult would be otherwise, following the analogy of the exclusive
jurisdiction cases, although seemingly there are few authorities
36(1938) 303 U. S. 41, 58 Sup. Ct. 459, 82 L. Ed. 638.37e.g., First National Bank v. Weld County, (1924) 264 U. S. 450. 44
Sup. Ct. 385, 68 L. Ed. 784.
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bearing upon the point, and there are none sufficiently persuasive
to warrant a definite conclusion.
(f) Necessity of exhaustion of administrative remedies in
cases of claim of unconstitutional action on the part of the tri-
bund. If an administrative tribunal, acting under a valid statute,
and possessing general jurisdiction of the controversy, takes action
lying within its jurisdiction, but which is alleged to be unconsti-
tutional as applied to the facts of the case, must the administra-
tive process nevertheless be pursued to the end? The question
arises most frequently in the case of property tax assessment
proceedings, where the charge of overvaluation or discrimination
in violation of due process or equal protection of the laws is so
frequently made. It is usually held in such cases that the doctrine
of exhaustion appliesY8  This conclusion is, no doubt, in accord
with common sense and orderly procedure. Even though the
action is unconstitutional on its facts, the administrative officials
should be accorded the opportunity to correct their own error, and
the courts should not be expected to interfere until the administra-
tive process is at an end.
(g) Necessity of exhausting administrative remedies in cases
of claim of unconstitutional statute. If the claim which is made
by the aggrieved party is that the entire statute under which the
tribunal has acted is unconstitutional, must resort nevertheless
be taken to all of the available administrative remedies, or, on the
other hand, since the question is purely one of constitutional law,
may the litigant avoid circuity of action by immediate resort to
the courts? Judicial decisions are scarcely sufficient to give an
adequate answer on authority. In the ease of Buder v. First
National Bank,3" a tax assessment and levy were attempted to be
imposed under a completely invalid statute. The court held that
the doctrine of exhaustion did not apply, and the plaintiff was en-
titled to proceed with his bill in equity. This result seems sound,
and is consistent with our conclusion that a bill in equity will be
acceptable without prior resort to the administrative agency in
case the attack is upon the constitutionality of the statute itself.
However, some doubt is thrown upon the matter by a United
States Supreme Court decision, Gorham Manufacturing Co. v. State
Tax Commission,40 and a vigorous argument in favor of applying
38First National Bank v. Weld County, (1924) 264 U. S. 450, 44 Sup.
Ct. 385, 68 L. Ed. 784.
30(C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1927) 16 F. (2d) 990, (certiorari denied, 274 U. S.
743, 47 Sup. Ct. 588, 71 L. Ed. 1321).40(1924) 266 U. S. 265, 45 Sup. Ct. 80, 69 L. Ed. 279.
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the doctrine of exhaustion even in such cases is made by Berger
in his article in the Yale Law Journal entitled "Exhaustion of
Administrative Remedies."'4 ' It is difficult, however, to see a
justification for forcing a litigant through a long and expensive
administrative process when in good faith he is advancing the
complaint that the entire statute upon which the process is based
is unconstitutional. The futility of requiring exhaustion of ad-
ministrative remedies in such cases is apparent. No tribunal is
going to hold its own enabling act unconstitutional.
So much for this survey of the doctrine of exhaustion of ad-
ministrative femedies-a doctrine derived as a self-imposed limita-
tion upon power of the courts in dealing with administrative
orders.- I have cited federal cases only, but the state court deci-
sions" follow similar pathways. By way of conclusion, we may
simply say that the doctrine is widely applied in a great variety
of situations, that the boundary lines of its applicability are far
from clear, that sharp disagreement among the decisions is not
uncommon, and that we must look to the future for the answers
to many of the questions raised.
III.: T E DOCTRINE OF ESTOPPEL
We come now to the third proposition, namely the rule ap-
plied in a limited number of cases to the effect that a party to a
controversy who fails to exhaust his administrative remedy and
later finds himself barred by lapse of time from doing so, may
not thereafter seek judicial relief, even though the administrative
action of which he complains contains error which would be
deemed to render it a complete nullity and void had proper
measures been pursued. This is a doctrine of estoppel. It is
really an extension of the doctrine of exhaustion. Normally, the
application of the doctrine of exhaustion simply forces a party
litigant to return to the administrative agency to litigate his case.
However, in some cases, because of lapse of time and statutory
time limits upon administrative processes, administrative relief is
no longer open to him. Under such circumstances the doctrine
of exhaustion merges into an estoppel. The litigant cannot secure
judicial relief even though the order affecting him is void, because
he has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. In short,
he is estopped by his error to pursue a collateral attack upon a
void order. When does this doctrine apply?
41(1939) 48 Yale L. J. 981.
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The operation of this rather harsh doctrine is excellently illus-
trated by the 1924 United States Supreme Court decision in First
National Bank v. Board of Commissioners of Weld Coltjty.42
The facts of the case are worthy of detailed attention. An-action
was brought in the federal district court to recover taxes paid
by the bank under protest, the claim being made that the taxes
were assessed and collected in violation 'of the due process and
equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment and also
in violation of sec. 5219, United States Revised Statutes, which
prohibits state taxation of national bank shares at a greater
rate than is imposed upon "other moneyed capital in the hands of
individual citizens." The plaintiff bank had prepared and delivered
to the county assessor a list of its shares stating their market
value. The assessor thereupon assessed the shares for taxation
at their full market value. At the same time hd assessed other
taxpayers in the county at 61 per cent of market value. The
county board of equalization accepted this assessment without
change. Plaintiff made no application to this board for revision.
The tax rolls were then transmitted to the state tax commission.
That tribunal adopted a horizontal increase of 63 per cent to bring
the general level of assessments up to 100 per cent of market value.
Plaintiff made no complaint to the commission although it could
have done so. The revised assessment was duly approved by
the state board of equalization. The result was that the plaintiff's
property was assessed at 63 per cent above market value. The
plaintiff was obviously forced to endure gross overvaluation and
discrimination, and was taxed at a rate in excess of the limit per-
missible under sec. 5219. The foregoing facts were alleged in
the action to recover taxes paid in excess of the lawful amount.
The defendant county demurred. The trial court sustained the
demurrer. On writ of error to the United States Supreme Court
that tribunal refused to consider the merits of the case, and affirmed
the action of the trial court. The Supreme Court held that the
plaintiff was estopped to argue the merits of its case, because it
had not appealed to the state tax commission and the state board
of equalization. In answer to the argument that the tax was
wholly void (not simply erroneous) because it was in contra-
vention of the fourteenth amendment and sec. 5219, and hence
should be subject to collateral attack by way of a suit to recover
payments, without first having pursued administrative appeals,
the court said:
42(1924) 264 U. S. 450, 44 Sup. Ct. 385, 68 L. Ed. 784.
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"We are met at the threshold of our consideration of the case
with the contention that the plaintiff did not exhaust its remedies
before the administrative boards and consequently cannot be
heard by a judicial tribunal to assert the invalidity of the tax. We
.are of the opinion that this contention must be upheld.... Plain-
tiff not having availed itself of the administrative remedies af-
forded by the statutes, as construed by the state court, it results
that the question whether the tax is vulnerable to the challenge
in respect of its validity upon any or all of the grounds set forth,
is one which we are not called upon to consider."
The full significance of the decision is apparent when it is
realized that discriminatory taxation of the precise sort com-
plained of by the bank is uniformly treated as void, and, in the
absence of the unfortunate circumstance of failure to pursue state
administrative appeals, is universally regarded as subject to
collateral attack, either in a proceeding to enjoin collection or a
suit to recover excess payments. Such tax levies are regarded as
void for the reason that they conflict with the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment, because they violate state
constitutional provisions requiring uniformity of taxation, and
because they violate sec. 5219 of the Revised Statutes. Further-
more, the fact that the Supreme Court decided the case on the
ground of failure to pursue statutory appeals rather than on the
ground of mere irregularity cured by failure to appeal, justifies
the inference that the tax was regarded by the court as void and
would have been subject to collateral attack if it had not been
for the plaintiff's failure to appeal to the higher administrative
agencies.
The full significance of the case will be realized when it is
understood that after the Supreme Court decision it was too
late for the aggrieved party to take advantage of the administra-
tive remedies which he had failed to pursue in the first instance.
The time had gone by for resort to those remedies. He was
barred by the time limitations created by the statute setting up
the tax assessment procedure. In short, although the assessment
upon his property was wholly void, he was estopped to claim
redress because of failure to pursue his administrative remedies.
This is indeed a harsh penalty, but there is a certain justification
for the result, harsh though it may be. In tax litigation an end
must promptly be reached in order that public revenues may be
fixed and certain. Public treasuries must not be embarrassed
by deferred shrinkage of anticipated revenues.
To what range of cases is this doctrine of estoppel applicable?
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Does it apply only in certain tax cases in which the party has
failed to pursue his administrative remedies? Or does it apply
in all tax cases? Or does it apply in all types of cases of ad-
ministrative action? A tentative answer may be given to each
of these questions. A final answer must await further develop-
ment of the doctrine.
The doctrine of estoppel has been applied in tax cases when
the alleged invalidity has rested upon gross overvaluation, upon un-
constitutional discrimination, and upon inclusion of property upon
the assessment roll over which the tax authorities had no juris-
diction.43 Note that these are all situations in which the error
on which reliance is placed falls within the presumed technical
competence of the administrative agencies. The issues at stake
are fact issues or issues involving administrative discretion, and
the statutes provide adequate opportunity for the taxpayer to
submit these issues to an appellate administrative agency within
the competence of which they would lie and which would pre-
sumably correct the error of which complaint is made. There is
good reason for applying the doctrine in such cases.
On the other hand, there have been a number of tax decisions
in which the doctrine of estoppel has been rejected and the tax-
payer has been granted judicial relief although he had not pur-
sued all of his administrative remedies-it having been too late
in each case to send him back to the administrative agency for
further proceedings. In Montana National Bank v. Yellowstone
County,4  the doctrine was not applied because the court felt that
in view of prior decisions of the Montana supreme court an
administrative appeal to the state board of equalization would
have been "utterly futile." In Munn v. Des Moines National
Bank,45 the circuit court of appeals of the eighth circuit held that
under a statutory arrangement allowing only a very few days
between the completion of the assessment books, at which time
the taxpayer first learned the amount assessed against him, and
the session of the Board of Equalization, the doctrine of estoppel
should not be applied in a case so complicated that more than
the allotted time was needed for the collection of evidence -and
the preparation of the case. In other words, there must be
adequate relief by way of the administrative process before the
43See Stason, Judicial Review of Tax Errors-Effect of Failure to Re-
sort to Administrative Remedies, (1930) 28 Mich. L. Rev. 637, 656.
44(1928) 276 U. S. 499, 48 Sup. Ct. 331, 72 L. Ed. 673.
4 (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1927) 18 F. (2d) 269.
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doctrine of estoppel will be applied. In Buder z. First National
Bank,4 6 the circuit court of appeals, also of the eighth circuit,
held that the failure to appeal to administrative authorities would
not bar collateral attack in the case at hand, since the tax was
levied under a void statute and the issue was not one with which
the administrative agency was particularly well fitted to deal.
In short, the courts have held that the doctrine of estoppel will
not be applied in cases where resort to the administrative agency
would be futile or inadequate, or where the statute is void. This
seems a sensible limitation on the doctrine. In all such cases it
may be presumed that the court possesses greater competence to
determine the matter properly than does the administrative agency,
and at the same time the hardship on the taxpayer of applying the
doctrine would be considerable.
So it seems fair to conclude that the doctrine of estoppel is
to be applied only in those tax cases in which the complaint of the
taxpayer is that an error has been committed by the tribunal that
falls within the presumed technical competence of the administra-
tive process and which are therefore precisely the kind of cases
which should, in the interests of common sense and governmental
comity, be forced into the pathway of administrative appeals. On
the other hand the doctrine is so savage in its results that it should
be limited to such cases, and should not bar judicial relief from
error of a nontechnical or purely legal content. In such cases the
doors of the court should be open. One further word should be
added. The state courts have seemed rather more inclined to
leave the door open than have the federal courts. Seemingly the
harshness of the doctrine has induced them to be more lenient
with the careless taxpayer.
We should next ask ourselves whether or not the doctrine of
estoppel is to be applied in administrative cases outside the tax
field. As has already been pointed out, the principal justification
of the application of the doctrine in tax cases is the necessity of
closing the bookkeeping for state and local revenues. If similar
reasons of public urgency are present in other areas of administra-
tive law, it seems logical to extend the doctrine to them. However,
such situations are rare. If, on the other hand, reasons of public
need of summary disposition of the cases are not present, the
doctrine is too harsh to be applied. In such areas of administra-
tive action, if the administrative remedy is still open, the doctrine
46(C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1927) 16 F. (2d) 990.
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of exhaustion should be applied and the party litigant should be
forced to complete the administrative process. In most situa-
tions the administrative process is still open. However, if the
administrative door is closed by lapse of time, the litigant should
be permitted his judicial redress regardless of the failure to take
all administrative steps, except in cases where his failure to take
such steps is the result of gross carelessness or deliberate design.
IV. THE NECESSITY OF EXHAUSTING ALL STATE PROCESSES,
INCLUDING BOTH ADMINISTRATIVE AND COURT PROCESSES,
BEFORE TURNING TO THE FEDERAL COURTS FOR RELIEF
The fourth and fifth propositions may be covered very briefly.
The fourth has to do with the necessity of exhausting all state
processes, both administrative and court processes, before turning
to the federal courts for relief; and the fifth has to do with the
proper procedural pathway in the federal courts after the state
administrative ant court processes have been exhausted. The two
propositions are interrelated.
To secure a clear idea of the fourth proposition, let us con-
sider an hypothetical case. Assume that a state public utilities
commission has issued an order fixing a new rate schedule for a
local electric power and light company. The rates fixed are so
low that the company claims confiscation will result, and hence
a federal question is involved. The commission has entered its
final order. There are no further steps to be taken before the
commission itself. Where should relief be sought? Should it
be sought in the state courts or in the United States courts?
Does the company have a free choice? We might suppose that
the state and federal courts would have concurrent jurisdiction,
the state court probably by way of statutory appeal, and the
federal courts by way of bill to enjoin. Let us see whether or not
this is the case.
We shall find that there are two barriers to federal court re-
lief: (1) a self-limitation imposed by the federal courts upon
themselves, and (2) a statutory limitation imposed by Congress
on the powers of the federal district courts. Under what circum-
stances will an aggrieved public utility find the doors of the
federal courts closed?
First, consider the limitation imposed by the federal courts upon
themselves, restricting their powers of dealing with state ad-
ministrative orders. The self-limitation was first developed in
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Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co." -, In that case it appeared that
the Virginia Corporation Commission had entered an order fix-
ing passenger rates on the Atlantic Coast Line. A bill in equity
was brought by the company to enjoin the members of the com-
mission from enforcing the order. Confiscation was alleged.
The question which was ultimately presented to the United States
Supreme Court was whether or not the federal district court
should have entertained a bill of injunction under the circum-
stances. It appeared that the Virginia constitution which estab-
lished the state corporation commission provided that commis-
sion orders should be subject to appeal to the court of appeals
of the state, and if, in the event of such appeal, the state court
should find the order of the commission erroneous, it might re-
verse, affirm, or modify the terms of the order. In other words,
the state court of appeals possessed power co-extensive with those
of the Corporation Commission. It could enter its own order as
to the rate schedules. The court really served as a reviewing
administrative agency, a superior quasi-legislative body. Under
such circumstances, the United States Supreme Court held that
comity between the United States government and the state gov-
ernment forbade federal equity intervention until after the state
procedure, including, that provided in the court of appeals, was
complete. In short, if state statutes or constitutions confer
appellate legislative or administrative powers upon the state courts,
the doors of the federal courts are not open until after the state
court processes themselves have been exhausted.
A later United States Supreme Court case, Oklahoma Natural
Gas Co. v. "Russel,48 placed a limitation upon the doctrine of the
Prentis Case. It was there held that, if confiscation is presently
in progress and the state court processes are inadequate to stay the
confiscation pending the determination of the case, then the
doctrine of comity of the Prentis Case must give way. Still an-
other limitation upon the doctrine may be developing in the light
of the recent decision, previously referred to, in City Bank Farm-
ers Trust 'Co. v. Schnader.49 In that case, as has been said, the
plaintiff brought suit in the federal district court to enjoin an in-
heritance tax assessment on the ground that the state had no
jurisdiction over property being subjected to state taxation.
Among other contentions the state urged, in reliance upon the
47(1908) 21i U. S. 210, 29 Sup. Ct. 67, 53 L. Ed. 150.
48(1923) "261 U. S. 290, 43 Sup. Ct. 353, 67 L. Ed. 659.
49(1934) 291 U. S. 24, 54 Sup. Ct. 259,78 L. Ed. 628.
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Prentis Case, that plaintiff should have been required to appeal
to the state court, since that tribunal had full power to determine
on review all of the fact issues on their merits, including not only
the jurisdictional question but also the valuation of the property
by the assessor. It was said, in effect, that the court served as a
superior appellate administrative agency. However, the United
States Supreme Court distinguished the Prentis Case on the
ground that it involved statutes which "delegated legislative powers
of regulation to an administrative body," whereas the inheritance
tax matter was merely "administrative." Are we then to limit the
Prentis doctrine to "legislative" matters and thereby make for
ourselves the troublesome, if not impossible, task of distinguishing
between "legislative" and "administrative?" Apparently so, al-
though the circuit court of appeals of the tenth circuit enter-
tained a different view in another tax assessment case-Kansas
City Southern Ry. v. Cornish.5" In spite of these several limita-
tions, the Prentis doctrine still is occasionally met in the cases
and is very much alive today. It was vigorously reaffirmed in 1932
in Porter v. Investors Syndicate,5' a case involving the revoca-
tion of a permit to engage in an investment business in Montana.
Second, consider briefly the Congressional limitation upon
the powers of federal courts to enjoin state administrative action.
For many years utilities attorneys have preferred to take their
cases to the federal district courts. From 1875 to 1910, sec. 24
of the Federal Judicial Code'2 gave authority to the federal district
courts to issue injunctions in cases like our hypothetical case
where more than $3,000 and a federal question have been involved.
A feeling became prevalent among state officials that the federal
courts were too favorable to the railroads and other public utili-
ties, and violent state animosities were aroused. Ever since 1909
attempts have been made in the Congress to modify the jurisdic-
tion of the United States courts in such a fashion as to preclude
or limit this practice. In 1910, sec. 266 of the Judicial Code was
adopted, setting up so-called three-judge courts and requiring
that all suits to enjoin state legislative or administrative action be
brought before them instead of before the single judge federal
district courts. Section 266 was amended several times to
50(C.C.A. 10th Cir. 1933) 65 F. (2d) 671.
51(1932) 286 U. S. 461 (aff'd on rehearing 287 U. S. 346, 52 Sup. Ct.
617, 76 L. Ed. 1226).
5218 Stat. at L. 470.
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strengthen its provisions, but it never fully satisfied state authori-
ties. Finally, on May 14, 1934, the Johnson Act was adopted.3
That Act purports to deprive the lower federal courts of juris-
diction to enjoin the enforcement of state administrative orders
when such orders (a) affect rates chargeable by a public utility, (b)
do not interfere with interstate commerce, and (c) have been made
after reasonable notice and hearing, and where a plain, speedy, and
efficient remedy may be had at law or in equity in the state courts.
This Act constitutes the most recent statutory event in a generation
or more of conflict between state sovereignty, attempting to pro-
mote the state's general welfare, and federal sovereignty, attempt-
ing to guard interests supposedly protected by the constitution.
The Act is now in the process of being interpreted by the courts.
Is our hypothetical public utility barred by the Johnson Act from
securing a federal equity injunction to restrain the enforcement
of the offending rate order? The answer is not a simple one. It
depends upon the interpretation of the Johnson Act, and par-
ticu!arly upon the meaning ascribed to the italicized clause.
Several cases have already been handed down by the federal
courts involving interpretation of the Act. The United States
Supreme Court has held that state judicial processes which do
not explicitly provide for a stay of the offending administrative
order pending a final determination of the cause in the state
supreme court cannot be deemed "plain, speedy, and efficient."
'
"
The federal district court in Oklahoma has held that a state
procedure under which the state courts exercise legislative as
well as judicial power on appeal from the state Corporation Com-
mission cannot be deemed to constitute a plain, speedy, and ade-
quate remedy in the courts of the state.55 In view of these inter-
pretations and others, and the obvious uncertainty as to what
constitutes a "plain, speedy, and adequate remedy" in the courts
of the state under the statute, not to mention a number of other
questions that have called for judicial consideration, it seems
apparent that, in spite of the Congressional attempts to impose
limitations, culminating in the Johnson Act, the federal equity
injunction is still a potent instrumentality for the protection of
aggrieved utility clients against erroneous state administrative
decisions. It should be noted, furthermore, that the Johnson Act
5348 Stat. at L. 775, 28 U. S. C. A. sec. 41, 28 F. C. A. sec. 41.54Mountain States Power Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm., (1936) 299 U. S.
167, 57 Sup. Ct. 168, 81 L. Ed. 99.55Cary v. Corporation Commission, (W.D. Okla. 1935) 9 F. Supp. 709.
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applies only to public utility rate orders. It does not limit the
jurisdiction of the federal courts in other areas of administrative
law.
So far as our hypothetical case is concerned, it is apparent that
we shall need more facts to give a definite answer as to the right
to a federal equity injunction. The rule of the Prentis Case and
the Johnson Act materially reduce the possibilities of direct equity
intervention, but the door is by no means completely closed.
V. THE PROPER PROCEDURAL PATHWAY IN THE FEDERAL
COURTS AFTER STATE ADMINISTRATIVE AND COURT
PRocEssEs HAVE BEEN COMPLETED
Finally, there is the question as to the proper procedural path-
way in the federal courts after all state processes, both admin-
istrative and court processes, have been completed. Shall we
seek federal relief in the district courts by way of an original bill
for injunction or other original suit, or shall we proceed to the
Supreme Court by way of appeal? This is by no means an easy
question to answer, nor is it purely an academic question." Three
statements will outline the problem and show the difficulties.
First, if the state supreme court possesses and exercises only
judicial powers in reviewing the state administrative order, its
decision becomes res judicata. Since no original action can pre-
vail in the federal district courts as against the plea of res judicata,
the only recourse is an appeal to the United States Supreme
Court.57
Second, if the state supreme court possesses and exercises
legislative or administrative powers (such as those involved in
the Prentis Case), its final order is in effect a legislative or ad-
ministrative order and should not be treated as res judicata. It
cannot be carried on appeal to the United States Supreme Court,
for that court has consistently refused to exercise jurisdiction over
the appeal of legislative or administrative orders. This was the
holding in Federal Radio Commission v. General Electric Co.,58
involving an appeal from the court of appeals of the District of
56Note, for example, the calamitous outcome of the very recent case,
Oklahoma Packing Co. v. Oklahoma Gas & Electric Co., (1939) 309 U. S.
4, 60 Sup. Ct. 215, 84 L. Ed. 537.
-7Detroit & Mackinac Ry. v. Mich. Ry. Comm., (1914) 235 U. S. 402,
35 Sup. Ct. 126, 59 L. Ed. 288; and Napa Valley Electric Co. v. R. R.
Comm., (1920) 251 U. S. 366, 40 Sup. Ct. 174, 64 L. Ed. 310.
58(1930) 281 U. S. 464, 50 Sup. Ct. 389, 74 L. Ed. 969.
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Columbia under the Federal Radio Commission Act of 1927. In
such case, the only proper resort is by original bill addressed to
the federal district courts.
Therefore, we must be able to tell whether the state supreme
court possesses and exercises judicial powers on the one hand
or legislative or administrative powers on the other hand. How
shall we tell? It has been held that, if a court possesses the power
to "substitute its own order" for a legislative order of the state
administrative agency, it possesses legislative power.5 But it is
not usually so easy to tell just what powers a court actually
possesses. Furthermore, no one really knows just what powers
are "legislative" as distinguished from "judicial."
Third, and finally, what shall we do if the state supreme court
possesses both judicial and legislative powers and we are unable
to tell from its opinion or its mandate just what power it actually
exercises? Does the pathway in the federal courts depend upon
the power possessed or the power exercised? How does one tell
with certainty in a given case which powers are exercised, when
either may be exercised? If one makes a mistake in the guessing
game, may he, after he learns his error, adopt the other alternative,
or is he barred by the lapse of time?
These are all practical questions that arise. In seeking their
answer, let it be said that one must explore the case law of the
particular state to ascertain, if possible, how the state supreme
court has characterized its own powers. Without aid from that
source, one can always resort to theory in an attempt to catalog
the functions. And finally, there is some evidence in the language
of the United States Supreme Court opinions to the effect that
the court will, in cases of doubt, presume that a state supreme
court has acted judicially.60 Certainly, in case of doubt, the
litigant who seeks relief in the United States Courts should take
his appeal to the Supreme Court. If he guesses wrongly, he
can still bring his bill in the district court, whereas, if he guesses
the other way, and wrongly, the time limit for the Supreme Court
appeal will probably have expired.
This, then, is our schedule of problems centering around the
timing of judicial remedies in the administrative arena. Notwith-
5OBacon v. Rutland R. R. Co., (1914) 232 U. S. 134, 34 Sup. Ct. 283.
58 L. Ed. 538.
6OGrubb v. P. U. Comm., (1930) 281 U. S. 470, 50 Sup. Ct. 374, 74
L. Ed. 972; R. R. Comm. v. Duluth St. Ry. Co., (1927) 273 U. S. 625, 628.
47 Sup. Ct. 489, 71 L. Ed. 807.
TIMING OF JUDICIAL REDRESS 587
standing the considerable bulk of case law already at hand, it is
impossible to write the answers to many of the questions. Per-
haps it is just as well. Administrative procedure is in a formative
stage-it is too early to crystallize the rules of the game. The
answers must be derived after the needs are more clearly under-
stood. In the meantime, however, it is appropriate for us to recog-
nize that such subtleties as the shadowy distinctions between legis-
lative and judicial, between fact and law, leave something to be
desired, especially in connection with purely procedural matters
that should be dealt with by as dear, precise, and orderly rules
as can be devised. In the evolution of the procedural phases of
administrative law, we should bear in mind that the guiding cri-
terion is and should be orderly process, permitting the administra-
tion reasonable freedom of action, but at the same time providing
adequate means of discovery and correction of error, with a
minimum of expense, uncertainty, and delay.
